

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report**

## **Automatic Partial Decoupling of Intraday Auction IDA1 for Delivery Date 21/05/2026**

21.05.2026

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# 1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

## 1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through

Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.


At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.

Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.


## MCSC Daily Timeline

### SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline



## SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

### IDA timeline



<b>IDA 1</b>	<b>14:40</b>	<b>14:45</b>	<b>15:00</b>	<b>15:20</b>
<b>IDA 2</b>	<b>21:40</b>	<b>21:45</b>	<b>22:00</b>	<b>22:20</b>
<b>IDA 3</b>	<b>09:40</b>	<b>09:45</b>	<b>10:00</b>	<b>10:20</b>

## 1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

## 2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting Intraday Auction 1 (IDA1) on 21/05/2026, which resulted in Automatic Partial Decoupling. The incident was caused by the absence of the OMIE Orderbook (OBK) in PMB by the Automatic Partial Decoupling deadline.

The root cause was an IT issue identified after the partial decoupling advance deadline, which prevented the day-ahead security analysis results from Red Eléctrica from being published within the required timeframe for OMIE’s participation in IDA1.

### 2.1 Course of Events

### 2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
<b>Incident occurrence.</b>	20/05/2026; 15:00	
<b>Triggering of Incident Committee.</b>	20/05/2026; 15:00	20/05/2026; 15:22
<b>APD was performed and only GME and HENEX remained coupled.</b>	20/05/2026; 15:12	
<b>IDA NEMO Coordinator sent the operational message IDA_JOINT_08: Delay in IDA Results Publication.</b>	20/05/2026; 15:20	
<b>IDA session completed .</b>	20/05/2026; 15:22	

### 2.3 Incident Cause

This incident was caused by an IT issue which was identified after the partial decoupling in advance deadline. This prevented the publication of the day-ahead security analysis results before the deadline required for OMIE to participate in IDA1. Consequently, OMIE was unable to generate the Order Book, leading to the triggering of the Automatic Partial Decoupling process.

The delay could not reasonably have been foreseen by Red Eléctrica prior to the Partial Decoupling advance deadline.

## **2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders**

### **Impacted NEMOs:**

All except GME and HENEX.

### **Impacted Bidding Zones:**

All Bidding Zones except IT and GR.

### **Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:**

All borders except IT-GR borders and Italian internal borders.

### 3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

<b>Short-term Solution by Affected Party</b>	<p>A performance optimization process has been implemented, which should prevent these IT issues from occurring again. Red Eléctrica continuously monitors and improves their internal processes.</p>
<b>Long-term Measures by Affected Party</b>	<p>N/A.</p>
<b>SIDC Project Lessons Learned</b>	<p>A new case is added in the procedures to allow manual partial decoupling before reaching the Automatic Partial Decoupling deadline in case of issues with the Security Analysis process on TSO side. This new procedure will give 10 more minutes to TSOs to identify such issues which should reduce the occurrence of Automatic Partial Decouplings due to issues affecting single parties or BZ.</p>